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71 
ATTEMPTING TO ENGAGE IN SOCIALLY 
COHERENT DIALOGUE ABOUT RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 
BY ALAN BROWNSTEIN 
INTRODUCTION 
 Most book reviews reflect the reviewer’s final conclusions 
about the author’s finished work. This review is more of a 
snapshot of the lengthy dialogue I have been engaged in for 
several months with Nelson Tebbe, the author of the book being 
reviewed. The symposium conference organized by the St. John’s 
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development in September 
2016, invited several church-state scholars to comment on a draft 
manuscript of Nelson Tebbe’s forthcoming book, Religious 
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age.1 However, the book was not fully 
completed when this multi-participant dialogue began. 
 Nelson’s 2 manuscript was provocative and challenging. All 
of the scholars who spoke at the conference offered positive and 
critical commentary on his work. And, of course, Nelson was 
given the opportunity to respond. That was the beginning of the 
dialogue, but it certainly was not the end, at least it was not the 
end for me. For several months after the symposium conference, I 
have been exchanging e-mails with Nelson, challenging some 
arguments in his book, seeking clarifications on other points, and 
responding to the e-mails I received in reply. Nelson addresses 
the comments of the reviewers in this symposium issue. I fully 
 
1 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017) (hereafter 
“TEBBE”). 
2 I am going to refer to Professor Tebbe as Nelson throughout my review. I have 
known him a long time. Further, because I consider this review to be part of an on-going 
conversation, it would be artificial to formalize the discussion by referring to him as 
Professor Tebbe or “Tebbe.” 
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expect that his responses will open the door to as many new 
issues as it resolves. It is an on-going conversation. 
 This review is also a temporary single point on a lengthy 
dialogue because the topic of Nelson’s book, religious liberty and 
equality in contemporary America, is in flux both as a matter of 
law and of social reality as well. From a legal perspective, the 
current constitutional framework is uncertain. For example, the 
most recent Supreme Court religion clause decision, Town of 
Greece v. Galloway,3 is divorced both from prior language in the 
Court’s jurisprudence and any plausible understanding of social 
reality.4  
 If new Supreme Court Justices committed to originalism 
are appointed and confirmed over the next four years, it is not 
clear what the repercussions will be for church-state doctrine. 
Justice Scalia, a self-proclaimed originalist, after all, was the 
author of the Court’s opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,5 
the case which effectively gutted the Free Exercise Clause. Post 
Smith, there is considerable debate about whether the Smith 
decision can be grounded in the original understanding of the 
First Amendment.6 Further, any new originalist Justice who is 
actually committed to grounding his or her decisions on the 
historical understanding, instead of using originalism to mask 
what are essentially ideologically determined constitutional 
interpretations, will find that adjudicating church-state disputes 
is a difficult undertaking.7 
 
3 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014). 
4 See Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Myopia: The Supreme Court’s Blindness to 
Religious Liberty and Religious Equality Values in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 48 Loyola 
of L.A. L. Rev. 371, 396-407 (2014) [hereinafter Brownstein, Constitutional Myopia]. 
5 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990). 
6 Compare Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1461—62, 1513 (1990) (arguing that 
constitutionally mandated religious exemptions are  consistent with the original 
understanding of the First Amendment), with Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional 
Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 948 
(1992) (contending that “In eighteenth-century America, where varied Christian sects 
bickered with one another and thrived, a constitutional right to have different civil 
obligations on account of religious differences was precisely what dissenters did not 
demand.”). 
7 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides a Weak 
Foundation for Interpreting Constitutional Provisions Relating to Religion, CARDOZO L. 
REV. 196, 196—97 (2009) [hereinafter Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides 
a Weak Foundation]. 
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 As a matter of social reality, the role of religion in public 
life and its relationship to government and the community is 
shifting and uncertain as well. There is a marked increase in 
Americans who are not affiliated with organized religions.8 
Attitudes toward Islam are challenging any consensus 
commitment to religious neutrality.9 With the doctrinal and 
social sand shifting so unpredictably with political winds, it is 
hard to write or say anything today with the sense that it will be 
valid or even meaningful tomorrow. 
 So this review is written on a floating log in fast moving 
flood waters that are altering the law and society river’s past 
path and boundaries. As such, it is much more an essay about 
ideas and proposals than an article based on case law and 
particular factual foundations. Therefore, I have included only 
the barest minimum of footnotes, many of which are to 
arguments and ideas discussed in my own work.10 That approach 
resonates not only with our uncertain world, but also with the 
central arguments and thesis of Nelson’s book. Religious 
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is a book of arguments and ideas, 
grounded in normative reasoning as much as it is in conventional 
legal doctrine. 
 
8 See, e.g., Robert P. Jones et  al., Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion – and 
Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (Sept. 22, 2016), 
https://www.prri.org/research/prri-rns-poll-nones-atheist-leaving-religion/; “Nones” on the 
Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 9. 2012), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/; Alan Cooperman, et al., U.S. 
Public Becoming Less Religious: Modest Drop in Overall Rates of Belief and Practice, but 
Religiously Affiliated Americans Are as Observant as Before, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/. 
9 See Rachel Zoll & Emily Swanson, AP-NORC Poll: Christian-Muslim split on 
religious freedom, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS – NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. RES. (Dec. 30, 
2015), http://apnorc.org/news-media/Pages/News+Media/AP-NORC-Poll-Christian-
Muslim-split-on-religious-freedom.aspx; How Americans Feel About Religious Groups, 
PEW RES. CTR. (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/2014/07/16/how-americans-feel-about-
religious-groups/; Controversies Over Mosques and Islamic Centers Across the U.S., THE 
PEW F. ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (2012), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/09/27/controversies-over mosques-and-islamic-centers-
across-the-u-s-2/; see generally Gregory C. Sisk
 
& Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious 
Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
231 (2012); see James A. Sonne, Domestic Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of 
Ordered Liberty, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 717 (2015). 
10 Because much of this review contrasts my own views on church-state issues with 
Nelson’s analysis, a significant number of citations are to my own work. 
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I. SOCIAL COHERENCE 
 Each of the commentators at the St John’s symposium was 
assigned particular chapters of Nelson’s book to focus on in 
drafting their remarks for the conference. I was assigned the 
chapters on freedom of association11 and employment 
discrimination.12 I will discuss these chapters later on in this 
review. It is difficult, however, to discuss particular topics 
discussed in the book without addressing the larger project and 
focusing on key principles which are recurring themes in 
Nelson’s analysis. Accordingly, this review will be substantially 
more expansive than an essay limited exclusively to my assigned 
chapters. And the logical place to begin this broader discussion is  
the method for thinking about liberty, equality and rights on 
which Nelson grounds his analysis – what he describes as social 
coherence.13 
 Nelson does not provide us with a short hand, one sentence 
definition of his social coherence methodology. The core idea is 
that reasoning about liberty and rights is legitimate and 
defensible against claims that it is as hoc and intrinsically 
irrational if it demonstrates coherence. That is, an analysis is not 
completely arbitrary and conclusory if it is tied together to a 
range of existing judgements about concrete cases and the 
principles that are derived from them that a person accepts as 
collectively accurate.14 That is the coherence part of the 
methodology.  
 The social dimension of the methodology arises from the 
inevitable reality that the interconnected judgments on which an 
individual bases new conclusions are grounded in the individual’s 
social and political identity. Social coherence unabashedly 
recognizes that our coherent judgments are necessarily 
contingent on our social location.15 It is not enough, however, for 
an individual to demonstrate self-awareness of his or her 
understanding of social reality. That understanding must be 
sufficiently shared to make arguments accessible and potentially 
 
11 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 80—97 (2017). 
12 Id. at 142—163.  
13 Id. at 8—11, 25–36. 
14 Id. at 8—9. 
15 Id. at 31. 
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persuasive to others. If we are talking about legal arguments, the 
legal equivalent of shared social reality involves some recognition 
of broadly accepted legal principles and constitutional doctrine. 
  I do not have a serious problem with social coherence as a 
way to approach difficult legal problems relating to religious 
liberty and equality. I would probably describe the concept a bit 
differently, but it seems to me that what Nelson identifies as a 
social coherence approach to problem solving describes what a lot 
of reasonable legal scholars including constitutional law 
professors generally do when we write articles and books. Most of 
us are not philosophers. We start with concrete situations that 
provide an accepted foundation for our arguments. We reason by 
analogy. But we do not reason in static isolation. We recognize 
that conditions, norms, and laws change. We consider the 
collective experience of the American society and legal system in 
developing arguments. We recognize that law – including 
constitutional law – requires a connection to the community, to 
the polity, to the people. Our arguments have to do more than 
make sense to us. They have to reflect a shared understanding of 
law and social reality. This is social coherence or at least a form 
of social coherence.    
 Thus, our arguments reflect our understanding of common 
sense morality. They try to resonate with uncontroverted or at 
least generally accepted long term principles of American 
constitutionalism. We can argue for sharp departures from 
accepted understandings, but when we do so we have to work 
harder to defend our positions as reasonable legal arguments. In 
law, advocates of sharp changes in doctrine bear a heavier 
burden of persuasion than advocates for continuity or 
incremental change. 
 Of course, law, even constitutional law, does involve 
experiments that may not seem socially coherent when they are 
first asserted. Here, I would suggest the reasonableness of the 
argument depends in part on the recognized inadequacy of 
accepted legal understandings. Perhaps more importantly, the 
test of time will determine whether these new experimental ideas 
eventually become part of the accepted wisdom. Social coherence 
in legal analysis has to include the possibility that the 
unreasonable may become reasonable and the reasonable may 
become unreasonable over time. 
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 So social coherence makes some sense to me at least for the 
level of discourse at which many legal scholars operate. 
Certainly, for the purposes of this review, I accept it as an 
operational methodology for argument. It is a relatively neutral 
foundation for a substantive discussion of religious liberty and 
equality issues. 
II. THE UNSTABLE AND SHIFTING FOUNDATIONS OF  
CHURCHSTATE RELATIONSHIPS 
 Nelson’s general approach to addressing religious liberty 
issues in his book is to focus on concrete areas of agreement 
about religious liberty, freedom of association, equality of status 
and treatment from which principles can be derived and by 
analogy to which disputes can be resolved. There is a 
foundational framework that underlies much of his analysis, 
however, that is accepted but not fully described. I had a difficult 
time understanding some of Nelson’s arguments until I 
understood the framework he was accepting. In social coherence 
terms, I needed to know the location in law and social 
understandings of Nelson’s analysis. Accordingly, let me sketch 
out briefly, and far too summarily, where I think the foundation 
of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is situated in the 
shifting sands of American church-state jurisprudence. 
 Put simply, and I mean very simply,16 I suggest that there 
are three macro, arguably socially coherent, understandings of 
the religion clauses and church-state doctrine. The first 
understanding, and this is the approach that I support and 
endorse, considers religion to be distinct both for constitutional 
purposes and in terms of social reality. With regard to social 
reality, this model for evaluating church-state issues recognizes 
that religion plays a role in the lives of religiously devout 
 
16 These three models are generic categories that do not pretend to capture the range 
of perspectives on church-state issues in the case law and commentary. I am well aware, 
for example, that some scholars who support the neutral allocation of funds to both 
religious and secular grantees for educational and social welfare programs do not support 
government sponsored religious displays or prayers that endorse religion or specific 
religions. Dramatically oversimplified as they are, however, I think these models reflect 
core differences that will help readers to locate and understand the arguments presented 
in Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age. At a minimum, they were useful to me in 
thinking about Nelson’s book. 
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individuals that is existentially and experientially distinct from 
the beliefs and identity of non-religious individuals. For the 
purposes of the model, this is more of a descriptive, than a 
normative conclusion.  
 For constitutional purposes, part of the distinctive nature 
of religion-state relationships is that they implicate multiple 
constitutional values including personal liberty and autonomy, 
equality of status and treatment among groups, freedom of 
speech, and the need to avoid the centralizing of power. 
Accordingly, this model attempts to promote the core values of 
religious liberty and religious equality. It also tries to minimize 
distorting the marketplace of ideas in favor of or against religious 
beliefs, ideas, and speech. Further, it attempts to decentralize 
power by avoiding too close a relationship between church and 
state.17  
 Generally speaking, this analysis suggests that these 
multiple goals are best accomplished by defining both religion 
clauses expansively and enforcing them with some rigor.  Indeed, 
for ease of discussion, we may refer to this approach as the 
Rigorous Religion Clause model. Thus, laws that substantially 
burden the exercise of religion must be justified under some form 
of meaningful review.18 Serious constitutional constraints are 
imposed on government subsidies of religious institutions and 
activities. Publicly sponsored prayers and religious displays 
endorsing religion are also restricted.  
 This model recognizes that while there are significant 
tensions between free exercise and establishment clauses values, 
in many ways the two clauses and the values they promote work 
 
17 I have spent the last 25 years writing about this understanding of the religion 
clauses. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: 
The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 
51 OHIO ST. L. J. 89 (1990) [hereinafter Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and 
Earthly Spheres]; Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of 
Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values—A Critical Analysis of “Neutrality Theory” and 
Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J. OF L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243 (1999) [hereinafter 
Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses]; ALAN BROWNSTEIN, THE SOUTER DISSENT: 
CORRECT BUT INADEQUATE IN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS DEBATING NEUTRALITY 
(Stephen W. Monsma, ed.) 151 (2002) [hereinafter BROWNSTEIN, The Souter Dissent]. 
18 The applicability and nature of that review may be nuanced and complicated. See 
e.g., Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 51 CASE WESTERN RES. L. 
REV. 55 (2006) [hereinafter Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously]. 
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to reinforce each other.19 This last point is of particular 
importance. There is a constitutional and political balance to this 
understanding of church-state relationships. Under this 
understanding, government is limited in its ability to interfere 
with religion and to promote religion.20  Further, constituencies 
seeking to protect religious liberty against the imposition of 
government burdens on religious belief and practice as well as 
those attempting to prevent the use of government resources and 
power to favor religion over the non-religious, or majority faiths 
over minority religions, all see some value in treating religion as 
distinct for legal and constitutional purposes.21 
 The framework or model described above requires some 
arbitrary line drawing. More problematically, at a micro level, it 
results in some individuals and groups incurring costs or harms 
and experiencing some arguable unfairness. Those costs and 
perceived unfairness are balanced to some extent and justified 
more generally as the price that must be paid to achieve the 
model’s multiple goals.  
 I think this Rigorous Religion Clause model was clearly a 
socially coherent view during relatively recent constitutional 
history. It should sound somewhat familiar. In general terms, it 
was the understanding of church-state doctrine accepted by the 
courts during the 1960’s and 1970’s and in many ways reflects 
much of the case law of the Warren and Burger Courts. 
 A great deal has changed over the last thirty to thirty-five 
years, however. The utility of the Free Exercise Clause to protect 
religious freedom has substantially diminished. According to the 
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, the Free 
Exercise Clause standing alone provides virtually no protection 
to religious individuals or institutions against neutral laws of 
general applicability.22 The central reasoning of this decision is 
that for constitutional purposes, it is permissible for the state to 
 
19 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing 
Mandates: Why the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clause are Stronger When Both Clauses are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1701 (2011) [hereinafter Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually 
Reinforcing Mandates].  
20 Id. at 1716—17. 
21 Id. at 1720—21.  
22 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
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treat religious exercise as if it is no different than secular 
practices. Indeed, along as the state does so, and subjects both 
religious and secular conduct to the same regulatory regime, the 
free exercise clause imposes no limit on state action. The Smith 
decision explains why so many current church-state disputes 
involve the adjudication of religious liberty statutes or 
controversies about the enactment of such laws.23  Today, federal 
constitutional protection of religious liberty rarely gets on the 
legal playing field.  
 The scope and rigor of the Establishment Clause has also 
been sharply reduced. Constraints on government funding of 
religious institutions have been substantially weakened.24  Most 
importantly, they have been reduced if not eliminated under a 
“neutrality theory” that challenges the idea that religious and 
secular institutions should be treated differently for funding 
purposes.25 Indeed, proponents of this approach draw strong 
analogies between free speech doctrine and religion clause 
doctrine.26  Under this perspective the Court’s analysis in 
Rosenberger v. Rectors of the University of Virginia,27  a case 
invalidating on free speech grounds a public university’s 
discriminatory refusal to fund a student group’s religious 
periodical while funding similar secular student expressive 
activities, is to be interpreted and applied as broadly as 
 
23 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) 
(adjudicating religious liberty claim under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act). 
24 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802 (2000); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 
536 U.S. 639, 643-644 (2002). The Court has also reinterpreted standing requirements to 
make it increasingly difficult to bring Establishment Clause challenges to federal court 
for adjudication on the merits. See Steven K. Green, The Slow, Tragic Demise of Standing 
in Establishment Clause Challenges, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. AND POL’Y (Sept. 2011), 
available at https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Green_-_Establishment_Clause.pdf; 
I.C. Lupu and R.W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 
Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115, 119 
(2008).  
25 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with 
Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L. J. 1, 20—21 (1997); Michael 
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 134 (1992); See 
generally STEPHEN V. MONSMA (ed.), CHURCH-STATE RELIGIONS IN CRISIS: DEBATING 
NEUTRALITY (2002). 
26 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 25, at 20; MONSMA, supra note 25, at 6—7.  
27 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995).  
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possible.28 Indeed, the basic idea that government may even 
exercise discretion to discriminate between secular and religious 
institutions and programs in awarding subsidies and grants is 
challenged.29  
 There has also been a significant retreat from prior case 
law limiting government’s ability to promote religious ideas and 
messages. Town of Greece is only the most recent and most 
egregious of these decisions.30 Basically, the Establishment 
Clause side of the church-state package I described in the first 
model has broken apart. Here again, free speech doctrine is often 
employed to justify the state facilitated expression of 
majoritarian religious messages and displays.31  
 Given the repudiation and fracturing of the Rigorous 
Religion Clause model, one may reasonably wonder exactly what 
is left of a socially coherent understanding of church-state 
relationships. I think the current answer is that there are two 
opposing perspectives that are being debated explicitly or 
implicitly. We can call one approach the One-sided Neutrality 
Model.32 This approach accepts “neutrality theory” and at least 
an implicit free speech framework for government funding of 
 
28  Thus, for example, in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720, 724, n.3 (2004) a case in 
which the Court upheld state constitutional restrictions that prevented a scholarship 
recipient from using public funds to pursue a degree in devotional theology, plaintiff 
argued that Rosenberger controlled the case and demonstrated that the state’s restriction 
on public aid for religious purposes violated the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment. 
29 See, e.g., Id. at 725; see also Brief for Petitioner at *26, *27, Trinity Lutheran 
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, Brief for Petitioner, 136 S. Ct. 891 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 
15-577) (arguing that it is unconstitutional for state to exclude religious daycares and 
preschools from government grant program). The Supreme Court accepted Petitioner’s 
argument, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 137 S.Ct. 2012 (2017) 
30 See Brownstein, Constitutional Myopia, supra note 4, at 398. 
31 See, e.g., Matthews, on behalf of M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 
421  (Tex. 2016); Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Establishment Clause 
and the Free Speech Clause in the Context of the Texas High School Cheerleader Religious 
Banner Dispute, JUSTIA, (Nov. 9, 2012), https://verdict.justia.com/2012/11/09/the-
establishment-clause-and-the-free-speech-clause-in-the-context-of-the-texas-high-school-
cheerleader-religious-banner-dispute; Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious 
Expression at High School Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society, 
NEXUS, 5 Nexus 61, 66—67 (2000). 
32 The one-sided nature of this model is occasionally conceded by its proponents. See, 
e.g., Esbeck, supra note 25, at 27 (acknowledging that “it would be rhetorical, but still a 
fair comment, to say that in neutrality theory religion gets the best of both worlds: 
religion is free of burdens borne by others but shares equally in the benefits.”); see also 
Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 17, at 246—56 (criticizing the 
one-sided, non-neutral nature of neutrality theory). 
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religious institutions and activities. Government may subsidize 
religion under any funding scheme that allocates resources 
according to neutral, secular criteria. Indeed, religious and 
secular grantees – either individual or institutional – are so 
similarly situated that it would be unconstitutional for the state 
to decline to subsidize religious institutions and activities when it 
is providing financial support to secular grantees or beneficiaries.  
The One-sided Neutrality Model also supports government 
endorsement of religion through state sponsored messages and 
displays, just as government can endorse secular messages at its 
discretion.33 But proponents of this approach continue to insist 
that religion is distinctive as a matter of social reality and that 
religious liberty deserves distinctive and significant 
constitutional or statutory protection, even when providing this 
protection imposes harm on third parties.   
 The other emerging approach, let’s call it the “Limited 
Liberty, Egalitarian Model” accepts the demise of Establishment 
Clause values to a considerable extent, particularly with regard 
to government funding of religion. But it also rejects the idea 
that religion is all that distinctive as a matter of social reality or 
that it should generally be thought to warrant special legal 
treatment.34 From this perspective, the foundation of “neutrality 
theory” underlying recent cases is more or less correct, but it 
can’t be isolated. It requires more than equal treatment between 
religious and secular recipients of government aid. It also 
requires in many cases the generalizing of the protection 
provided to religious conscience and religious associations.  
 I think Nelson’s book is a thoughtful, searching attempt to 
demonstrate that one of these two current competing approaches 
is more socially coherent and provides for better church-state 
relationships in our society. His analysis is grounded fairly firmly 
in the emerging Limited Liberty, Egalitarian Model. His support 
 
33 I recognize that there are church-state scholars who support a neutrality model for 
government funding, but also reject the government endorsement of religion through 
state sponsored prayer and religious displays. The three models I discuss are far too 
limited to describe the broad range of church-state perspectives that are presented in the 
academic literature or in social dialogue. Nonetheless, I think they capture core paradigm 
positions that reflect central, socially coherent disagreements about church-state 
relationships. 
34 See generally, Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1351 (2013). 
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for this model is hardly unjustified. The alternative approach, 
the One-sided Neutrality Model, has lots of problems.   
 The One-sided Neutrality Model is arguably internally 
incoherent because the lack of a distinction between the religion 
and the secular in neutrality theory and the analogy to free 
speech doctrine in funding cases seem inconsistent with the idea 
that religion deserves special protection and should receive 
special exemptions from regulations – when neither protection or 
exemptions are available to non-religious individuals and 
institutions. Further, the costs and harms and perceived 
unfairness of protecting religion alone can’t be balanced against 
or justified by a comprehensive church-state framework 
promoting multiple values.  The One-sided Neutrality Model is 
much more limited and well, one-sided, in the values it protects 
and promotes. Also, because this model supports expansive 
government funding of religious organizations, it undermines the 
persuasive force of claims to religious autonomy. It is much more 
difficult to justify independence from government control when 
an institution or program is funded by the state to serve public 
purposes.  
 I do not suggest that the One-sided Neutrality Model is 
indefensible or that it lacks support in the polity and in law. 
There is more than enough residual grounding in law and culture 
to make this perspective socially coherent if not persuasive. But 
that after all is the reason for Nelson’s book. He sees the need to 
challenge the One-sided Neutrality model and to provide a more 
socially coherent and persuasive alternative to it. 
 As a general matter, I believe the One-sided Neutrality 
Model is vulnerable to many of Nelson’s arguments. In many 
respects the model is hard to justify. From my perspective, 
moving away from the Rigorous Religion Clause Model – the 
approach I support – was a major mistake.  I think from a 
multiple values perspective, protecting distinctive free exercise 
rights or expansive religious accommodations under a legal 
regime without establishment clause constraints on the state 
promotion of religion is difficult to defend.  
 This does not mean, however, that I agree with important, 
even critical arguments presented in Religious Freedom in an 
Egalitarian Age. But the direction of my disagreement is 
important. I am challenging Nelson’s thesis from the perspective 
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of someone who supports a return to the Rigorous Religion 
Clause Model. I am not convinced that religious liberty and 
equality can be adequately protected under a framework that 
minimizes the distinctive nature of religion and allows for 
substantial government funding of religious institutions. Nelson’s 
response to my position in part is that we have moved too far 
away from this old model for it to continue to provide a socially 
coherent foundation for analyzing church-state disputes. I have 
to acknowledge the power of that argument. I recognize how far 
we have moved, and from my perspective how much we have lost, 
over the last 30 years. I have been watching, lecturing and 
writing with dismay as the church-state world of life and law has 
changed for the worse over the last 30 years.  
 I do not believe, however, that 30 years of bad law and bad 
policy requires us to choose between what I consider to be two 
problematic approaches to church-state relationships. The One-
sided Neutrality Model is not only problematic in its own right. 
Its failing has a dynamic dimension to it. The shift to this model 
substantially undermines the distinctive treatment of religion 
and makes challenges to a robust, distinctive regime of religious 
accommodations much more persuasive. The One-sided 
Neutrality Model’s vulnerabilities provoke alternative 
approaches that respond to its defects, but risk creating new and 
different problems for religious liberty and anti-discrimination 
values in doing so. Thus, the core question for me is not whether 
a book like Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age can 
effectively criticize the weaknesses of the One-sided Neutrality 
Model.  I think it can and does. The critical question is whether a 
more comprehensively neutral alternative of the kind that 
Nelson proposes can adequately promote and protect the multiple 
values that are in play in church-state issues. I have questions 
and concerns about an approach that generalizes religious liberty 
protection to a more generic regime of associational freedom and 
freedom of conscience. Those questions and concerns are the 
primary focus of my review of Nelson’s book. 
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III. THE AVOIDING HARMS PRINCIPLE AND THE UNFAIRNESS TO 
OTHERS PRINCIPLE 
 Nelson identifies two core principles that operate to limit 
the scope of religious exemptions or accommodations: the 
avoiding harms principle35 and the unfairness to others 
principle.36 These principles would apply to limit both 
constitutionally grounded exemptions and discretionary 
legislative accommodations. The Establishment Clause operates 
to enforce the avoiding harms principle in appropriate 
circumstances. The Establishment Clause arguably may have a 
role to play in enforcing the unfairness to others principle as well 
– although its applicability in this regard is less certain and the 
circumstances in which it would operate to invalidate religious 
exemptions would be more limited.37 
 
A. The Avoiding Harms Principle 
 At a generic, broad, and abstract level, the harm or costs of 
laws should be considered along with the exemption from the 
laws, and benefits should not be examined separately from costs. 
We should not look at benefits alone. We should also look at 
costs. But Nelson makes a much more precise argument here. He 
contends that religious liberty exemptions (whether recognized 
by courts as a matter of constitutional law, created by specific 
acts of legislative discretion, or required by a general religious 
liberty statute such as RFRA)  should be limited to those 
situations in which the exemption does not cause unacceptable 
harm to third parties. Here Nelson notes correctly that the 
Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that the 
Establishment Clause imposes constraints on religious 
exemptions that favor certain faiths over other or that extend too 
far by imposing undue burdens on non-beneficiaries.38 
 
35 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 49—70. 
36 Id. at 71—79. 
37 Id. at 74—77 (discussing among other cases, the Court’s extension of conscientious 
objector exemptions to include secular pacifists).  
38 Id. at 55—56.  
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 I do not question Nelson’s basic argument that the 
Establishment clause imposes some cap or limit on the scope of 
religious accommodations because of the harm they cause to 
third parties. I have two distinct concerns, however, about his 
discussion of this principle. As a practical matter, I have 
reservations about the way that Nelson describes the operational 
methodology he endorses for determining when an exemption 
goes too far and burdens third parties too much. As a conceptual 
matter, I think the avoiding harm principle is more complicated 
than Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age suggests. 
B. Practical Problems with Applying the Avoiding Harms 
Principle 
 The primary practical question about the avoiding harm 
principle, as Nelson acknowledges, is determining when the 
burden on third parties necessitates the invalidation of an 
exemption on Establishment Clause grounds.39 While the 
Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that some such limit exists, 
it has provided very little guidance on how it should be identified. 
The Court’s position here has been virtually all bark and no bite: 
there is no coherent line of cases providing criteria or doctrine for 
answering this question.40 
 Given the paucity of authority, a variety of answers might 
be considered socially coherent as they would not directly 
contradict an accepted line of authority. Nelson chooses as a 
starting place for identifying unacceptable burdens,41 the 
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines 
v. Hardison 42, the case interpreting Title VII’s requirement that 
employers must reasonably accommodate the religious practices 
of their employees unless doing so would result in an undue 
hardship to their business.43 Under the Court’s interpretation of 
this statute anything more than a de minimis burden would 
 
39 Id. at 60—61.  
40 Nelson acknowledges that cases like Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints are inconsistent with the avoiding harms 
principle. See TEBBE, supra note 1, at 56—57. I find it more difficult to reconcile this case 
and others, such as Texas Monthly v. Bullock, than he does. 
41 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 62. 
42 432 U.S. 63 (1977).  
43 Id. at 78-84.  
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constitute an undue hardship and relieve the employer of any 
duty to accommodate the religious needs of an employee.44 
 As I shall explain shortly, Nelson ultimately describes a 
standard that is somewhat less draconian than this one for 
determining whether religious accommodations are 
constitutionally permissible. Yet it is difficult for me to 
understand why he grounds his analysis in the Hardison decision 
in the first place. Consider how dissenting Justices Marshall and 
Brennan, strong supporters of both free exercise rights and 
establishment clause constraints on the government’s promotion 
of religion, described the majority opinion in Hardison: 
 “Today’s decision deals a fatal blow to all efforts under 
Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious 
practices. The Court holds, in essence, that although the EEOC 
regulations and the Act state that an employer must make 
reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take account of 
religious observances, the regulation and Act do not really mean 
what they say. An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant 
even the most minor special privilege to religious observers to 
enable them to follow their faith. As a question of social policy, 
this result is deeply troubling, for a society that truly values 
religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of minority religions 
to make the cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their 
job. And as a matter of law today’s result is intolerable, for the 
Court adopts the very position that Congress expressly rejected 
in 1972, as if we were free to disregard congressional choices that 
a majority of this Court thinks unwise. I therefore dissent.”45  
 I think it is fair to say that most advocates for religious 
liberty condemn the Hardison standard for providing far too little 
protection to employees who are members of minority faiths.46 
Their arguments have increasingly received favorable responses. 
California, for example, is a deep blue state. The Democratic 
Party controls virtually all statewide offices and both houses of 
the state legislature.47 Yet in 2012, California enacted the 
 
44 Id. at 84.  
45 Id. at 86—87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
46 This is a personal observation, but I cannot recall ever speaking with a religious 
liberty advocate who had anything positive to say about the Hardison decision. 
47 California State Legislature, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_State_Legislature (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
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California Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) amending 
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). FEHA 
imposed a duty on employers to accommodate the religious 
practices of employees that had been interpreted to parallel the 
Hardison standard.48 As amended by WRFA, the de minimis 
standard of the Hardison opinion was replaced with the 
following, much more demanding language: 
(u) “Undue hardship” means an action requiring 
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light 
of the following factors: 
(1) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed. 
(2) The overall financial resources of the facilities involved 
in the provision of the reasonable accommodations, the 
number of persons employed at the facility, and the effect 
on expenses and resources or the impact otherwise of these 
accommodations upon the operation of the facility. 
(3) The overall financial resources of the covered entity, 
the overall size of the business of a covered entity with 
respect to the number of employees, and the number, type, 
and location of its facilities. 
(4) The type of operations, including the composition, 
structure, and functions of the workforce of the entity. 
(5) The geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal 
relationship of the facility or facilities.49 
 Given the significant criticism and challenges directed at 
the Hardison analysis as a statutory standard and the strong 
legislative attempts to strengthen the duty of employers to 
accommodate the religious practices of employees, I’m not at all 
sure why it was necessary to look to Hardison as the basis for 
determining constitutional constraints on religious 
accommodations. This is particularly the case because Nelson 
 
48 Rosanna Sattler & Laura Otenti, CA Workplace Religious Freedom Act, EMP. L. 
STRATEGIST, http://www.pbl.com/uploads/23/doc/CA_Workplace_Religious.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2017).  
49 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(u) (Deering 1980). 
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envisions a greater scope to permissible religious exemptions 
than the literal language of Hardison would suggest. Nelson 
explains that some lower courts in adjudicating accommodation 
cases under Title VII have been engaged in a more thoughtful 
inquiry of burdens on religion and costs to others.50 Even if most 
courts adjudicating these cases do not engage in such an inquiry, 
however, Nelson argues that the best understanding of the undue 
hardship test and the standard he endorses for evaluating the 
constitutionality of accommodations under the Establishment 
Clause “involves a relational determination.”51 Some form of 
balancing is required. “If the cost to others is slight in 
comparison to the burden on religious freedom, courts [should 
find the cost] to be de minimis”52 and, accordingly, the 
accommodation should withstand Establishment clause review. 
The question for courts is whether the costs of accommodations 
“are relatively light compared to the interference with religious 
freedom that the accommodation is designed to remedy.”53 
 A standard of review requiring courts to employ some kind 
of a balancing test to determine when a religious accommodation 
violates the Establishment Clause has much to commend it.  I 
remain uncertain, however, as to how Nelson envisions the 
balancing test will work. His evaluation of the of the Court’s 
reasoning in Hardison makes me uneasy. In discussing the 
religious freedom side of the balance, I would have emphasized 
that observing the Sabbath is considered to be a fundamental 
obligation of many faiths. While I agree with Nelson that the cost 
of the accommodation, another employee losing the opportunity 
to take a weekend day off, is a real harm,54 in my judgment the 
critical issue in these cases is what steps may be taken to reduce 
this cost to an acceptable level. An employee required to work on 
Saturday to accommodate a Sabbatarian might receive 
preferences in vacation scheduling or overtime opportunities or 
an increase in pay (offset perhaps by a reduction in the pay of the 
accommodated employee) or a variety of other valued privileges 
 
50 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 65—66.  
51 Id. at 66. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 61. 
54 Id. at 63; Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, supra note 18, at 71. 
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to mitigate his loss. There may be situations where no such 
alternatives are possible and the harm to other employees 
justifies denying the accommodation. But I would not consider 
the administrative convenience costs incurred by the employer in 
mitigating those costs to be a sufficient justification for denying 
the accommodation – unless the employer confronts truly 
significant difficulty and expense in doing so. 
 If I am reading him Nelson correctly, I think he would put 
a thumb on the Establishment Clause side of the balancing scale 
in these cases. I worry about the weight of that thumb. And I 
would put a thumb on the religious accommodation side of the 
scale. From my perspective, the harm caused by a religious 
exemption must be very substantial and not susceptible to being 
mitigated or spread to bar the accommodation under the 
Establishment Clause. 
 I am also uncertain as to whether Nelson would require 
courts to extend any deference to the legislature’s conclusion that 
on balance an accommodation was warranted. Consider the 
California WRFA religious accommodation statute described 
earlier. Would that law be subject to an Establishment Clause 
challenge on its face under Nelson’s analysis because it requires 
employers to incur serious costs before they can deny an 
accommodation? Would any weight be assigned to the 
legislature’s considered conclusion that this statutory standard 
was necessary to protect religious minorities’ access to 
employment and a livelihood?  
 Alternatively, the new California law might only be subject 
to Establishment Clause challenge as applied. Courts would have 
to consider the actual cost of the accommodation to the employer, 
fellow employees, or other third parties and weigh it against the 
importance of the employee’s religious liberty interests. In 
considering that possibility I think it is important to confront a 
core issue that a balancing test presents in these circumstances. 
A primary reason why the Supreme Court concluded that free 
exercise rights could not be protected against neutral laws of 
general applicability in Employment Division v. Smith is that it 
doubted the ability of federal courts to fairly and effectively 
balance the state’s interest in refusing to exempt religious 
individuals or institutions from general laws against the burdens 
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the denial of an accommodation would impose on religious 
freedom.55  
 The balancing test Nelson proposes would seem to assign a 
very similar task to federal courts – although here courts are 
asked to use a balancing analysis to determine whether the 
Establishment Clause requires the invalidation of an 
accommodation while in Smith courts had to use a balancing test 
to determine whether the Free Exercise requires the adoption of 
an accommodation. In either case, doubts about the subjectivity 
and indeterminacy of such a balancing analysis require some 
attention and discussion. Certainly one might ask this question: 
if a balancing test may be reasonably and effectively employed 
under the Establishment Clause to invalidate unacceptably 
burdensome accommodations, is there any reason to continue to 
support the Smith opinion’s argument that the balancing of 
religious freedom and state interests is so difficult and 
constitutionally improper that it requires dramatically limiting 
the scope of free exercise rights?56 
C. Conceptual Problems with the Avoiding Harms Principle 
 The conceptual problem with the avoiding the harms 
principle is more complicated. Nelson recognizes there is an issue 
here. He is working on resolving it. That is more than I can say 
for myself. I am only flagging the issue because I was provoked 
into thinking about it by reading Nelson’s manuscript. 
 The problem is the following: as a general matter, laws 
often cause harm to individuals. And exemptions from laws do so 
as well. Both religious and secular individuals are regularly 
exposed to harm from laws and exemptions from laws designed to 
further secular goals and beliefs. I take the following to be an 
accepted principle of constitutional law. As a default principle, 
laws or exemptions from laws do not violate the Constitution 
 
55 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).  
56 For a discussion of the similarity between the balancing required to determine if a 
free exercise exemption would be required and the balancing involved in determining 
whether a discretionary exemption goes too far and violates the Establishment Clause, see 
Alan Brownstein, Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue, A Discussion of Justice Steven’s 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 605, 643—648 
(2012). 
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solely because the cause harm to, or impose costs on, third 
parties who may not be directly benefited by the law. 
 Further, it is not just statutory law or the common law that 
causes harm to third parties. Constitutional law does as well. 
Courts will often protect the exercise of constitutional rights even 
though doing so causes real harm to individuals. Rights are 
expensive political goods. They require protection even when 
there is a painful price for doing so. Freedom of speech is an 
obvious example. Moreover, the harm caused by protecting 
speech is not always spread broadly or equally. When the Nazis 
march through Skokie, a community where many Jews and 
Holocaust survivors reside; when a defamed victim’s reputation 
is destroyed but he or she cannot satisfy the constitutional 
standard for obtaining redress; when protestors rejoice in the 
death of a soldier at the cemetery where parents are mournfully 
burying their son or daughter, the exercise of rights causes 
special harm to particular individuals. Thus, it seems to me that 
there is a socially coherent foundation for recognizing that free 
exercise mandated exemptions or discretionary legislative 
accommodations, just like the protection provided to other rights, 
may be justifiable even though they cause some real harm to 
others. 
 Of course, there is an Establishment Clause in the First 
Amendment and the courts have recognized that at some point 
religious exemptions may extend too far and impose unacceptable 
costs on third parties. When that occurs, the Establishment 
Clause can be invoked to challenge the exemption.  
 Exactly why is that so? Since many secular laws, and 
secular exemptions to their application, result in third party 
harms without being subjected to serious constitutional review, 
why does the Establishment Clause impose constraints on only 
religious exemptions that cause harm to third parties? The 
answer to this question, and Nelson makes this point, would 
seem to be that there is something distinctively problematic as a 
constitutional matter about people suffering harms as a result of 
the state exempting religious individuals or institutions from 
regulations that other individuals and institutions must obey. 
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The government cannot require some people to incur costs in 
order for other people to engage in religious exercise.57 
 This idea certainly has constitutional roots. It builds on the 
contention that the religious liberty of taxpayers is impermissibly 
burdened when the taxes they pay are used for religious worship, 
proselytizing or instruction. It resonates with the Establishment 
Clause doctrine restricting government subsidies of religious 
institutions and activities. That doctrine has been undermined by 
judicial decisions in recent years (I think incorrectly), but one can 
certainly argue that it was long accepted and had an extended 
pedigree. 
 If this is the foundation of the argument, however, more 
needs to be done to connect it to the conclusion that religious 
exemptions violate the Establishment Clause if they cause harm 
to third parties. What happens, for example, if the state 
generalizes the law to exempt both religious and secular acts of 
conscience? (Nelson’s fairness principle, discussed later in his 
book and in this review, seems to strongly endorse general 
exemptions over religion specific exemptions.) Here, the harm to 
third parties continues. Indeed, it increases in scope. A broader 
harm causing exemption typically means that more people will 
be harmed. Notwithstanding the increase in the extent of the 
harm caused by the accommodation, does the fact that the 
beneficiaries of the accommodation are both secular and religious 
mean that the Establishment Clause limit on third party harms 
no longer applies? That’s an arguable solution to the problem, 
but would it be a preferred solution? More people would suffer 
harm. Further, it is not even clear that a generalized neutral 
exemption solves the constitutional concern about people not 
having to incur costs in order to allow other people to engage in 
religious exercise. 
  After all, even under a generalized exemption statute, it 
may be clear that some, perhaps most, of the harmful conduct 
permitted by the exemption will be engaged in for religious 
purposes. If we were talking about the funding of religious 
institutions, the case law enforcing strong Establishment Clause 
constraints on subsidies to religious institutions held that the 
generality of the funding scheme standing alone did not 
 
57 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 52—54. 
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immunize it from Establishment Clause review.58 One might 
argue that a similar analysis should apply to exemptions so that 
even if the exemption is generalized, there would still be a reason 
to be concerned because some people would be harmed by 
exempting a religious person or institution from an otherwise 
generally applicable law? 
 This response suggests that even if the exemption is 
generalized, the Establishment Clause should still operate to 
protect people from harm caused by exempting religious 
individuals or institutions from generally applicable laws. But 
that solution also raises awkward questions. Would this mean 
that the exemption has to be more limited for the religious 
individual or institution than it is for the secular individual or 
institution because only the former is subject to Establishment 
Clause constraints? Because the concern about people incurring 
costs to allow others to engage in religious exercise does not arise 
when exemptions accommodate secular beliefs, the exemption for 
secular individuals and institutions would not need to be 
narrowed to reduce harm to third parties. Only the application of 
the exemption for religious individuals and institutions is limited 
by the Establishment Clause third party harm principle. 
 Still another alternative would suggest that Establishment 
Clause constraints on exemptions accommodating both religious 
and secular acts of conscience which result in third party harms 
should apply across the board. The Constitution would preclude 
the accommodation of conscience based on either religious or 
secular beliefs if an exemption caused unacceptable harm to, or 
imposed unacceptable costs on, third parties. This solution solves 
some problems, but it leads to one important unanswered 
question. Why should we have a constitutional framework that 
accepts exemptions from laws for any number of reasons to 
further a seemingly limitless range of state interests – 
notwithstanding the harm these exemptions cause to third 
parties – with only one exception: exemptions are 
constitutionally impermissible if they are designed to respect and 
protect the conscience of the individual? 
 
58 See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee for Pub. Educ. 
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).  
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 I do not claim to have an answer to these questions. I 
believe they have not been addressed in case law and 
commentary to any serious extent because Establishment Clause 
cases invalidating accommodations on the grounds that they 
impose unacceptable harm on third parties have been rare and 
relatively anomalous. If a more demanding Establishment 
Clause limit on accommodations was enforced by courts, these 
questions would become more salient. I look forward to reading 
Nelson’s future work addressing these issues. 
D. The Unfairness to Others Principle 
 The unfairness to others principle can be stated simply. It 
is unfair to grant religious individuals exemptions from laws 
without providing a similar exemption to individuals with 
comparably profound secular commitments that are burdened by 
the laws’ requirements. Indeed, providing religious exemptions 
exclusively in such situations is not only normatively unfair, it 
denies nonreligious individuals the right to equal citizenship.59 
 I respect, but disagree, with much of Nelson’s analysis 
here. Part of the problem is that I think there are persuasive 
reasons for distinguishing religious exercise from other conduct 
and beliefs. Nelson appears to me to be more ambivalent about 
this distinction. But we are not going to resolve this issue in this 
symposium – so let’s leave this disagreement aside for the 
moment.  
 I also think that the distinctive nature of religion is more 
generally accepted in our society than the idea that religion is 
just another belief system. In my judgment, the idea that religion 
is distinctive resonates to a greater extent with the conventions 
of our jurisprudence than the view that religion is neither special 
nor deserving of specific accommodations. There are hundreds of 
religious accommodations in local, state and federal law, the 
overwhelming majority of which apply on their face to religion 
alone.  Most notably, in addition to the First Amendment which 
speaks of religion, not conscience, there is the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)60, numerous state RFRAs,61 the 
 
59 See TEBBE, supra note 1, at 71—73. 
60 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 §§ 2—7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb(4) 
(2012). 
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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA)62 which applies to both religious land use and the 
religious exercise of inmates, and the exemption in Title VII for 
religious organizations.63 Thus, I would argue that, at a 
minimum, the principle that religious beliefs and practices 
warrant special protection and exemptions is a socially coherent 
summary of accepted legal and social mores. 
 I also am uncertain as to how courts can identify what 
counts as a secular profound commitment that is comparable to 
religion. I am inclined to agree with Andrew Koppelman’s 
argument in his paper in this symposium64 and elsewhere65 that 
there is simply no way to identify, protect and cabin the class of 
all deeply valued human concerns.66 More importantly, I do not 
view the recognition of particular liberty rights, but not others, 
as denigrating individuals who value other protected interests. In 
addition to religion, we recognize and provide special protection 
and privileges to rights involving marriage, speech, family and 
children, keeping and bearing firearms, and abortion.67 
Relationships, activities, and identities outside of these 
designated interests, however deeply felt and valued they may 
be, are treated differently.68 The artist and author receive 
 
61 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2017); FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-761.061 (2017); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02 (2017). 
62 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act §§ 2-8, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-
2000cc(5) (2012). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012). 
64  Andrew Koppelman, Tebbe and Reflective Equilibrium, 31 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. 
DEV. 125 (2018). 
65 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY, 165 (2013).  
66 Id. (“Because no single legal rule can protect all deeply valuable concerns, more 
specific rules are necessary.”). 
67 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (recognizing that 
marriage is a protected right); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) 
(recognizing that keeping and bearing firearms is a protected right); Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recognizing that abortion is a 
protected right); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(recognizing  that family unity is a protected right); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
213—14 (1972) (recognizing that religion is a protected right); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of 
Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (recognizing that 
speech is a protected right). 
68 See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8—9 (1974) (determining that 
the interest of family members in living together is a protected right, but the interest of 
college roommates in living in the same dwelling is not).  
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constitutional protection for their work.69 The craftsman whose 
product is non-expressive does not.70 For some people, freedom of 
speech is largely irrelevant to their lives. Protecting the land 
they own and on which they base their livelihood and identity 
might be a far more valued interest. Again, I largely agree with 
Andrew Koppelman that assigning value to and protecting one 
liberty interest does not insult or deny the value of other 
interests.71 
 I do not mean to suggest that there are no circumstances in 
which it seems to be normatively unfair to protect religious 
exercise or religiously motivated conduct, but not to protect 
similar secular practices or conduct motivated by secular beliefs. 
In most such situations, however, I think the foundation of our 
concern is not the difference in treatment. The problem is not 
that religion is unfairly protected, it is that these other interests 
arguably deserve constitutional or statutory recognition in their 
own right. I am open to the argument that acts of secular 
conscience or other secular commitments deserve to be 
recognized and protected in appropriate circumstances; I make 
no claim that the list of rights we currently recognize is finite 
and exclusive. I do not agree, however, that because we recognize 
some liberty rights, we are denying rights of equal citizenship to 
individuals whose deepest values have not been recognized as 
liberty rights. 
 Here again, however, I think it is important to understand 
this disagreement about the fairness of religious exemptions in 
terms of the three models I described at the beginning of this 
book review.72  I look at religious exemptions from the 
perspective of the Rigorous Religion Clause model, a 
constitutional regime in which government support for religion is 
sharply limited by Establishment Clause constraints on the 
government’s funding of religious institutions. Those constraints, 
 
69 See, e.g.,  Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) 
(recognizing that even new mediums like video games are sufficiently expressive to be 
protected speech under the First Amendment). 
70 See, for example, the current debate about whether baking a wedding cake is 
protected as speech  in Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD v. Civil Rights Comm. No. 16-1111, 
Dec. 5, 2017, https://www. Supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
71 KOPPELMAN, supra note 65, at 165 (“Acknowledgment of the unique value of each 
human good is no insult to the others.”). 
72 See supra, notes 16—35 and accompanying text. 
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standing alone, may seem unfair to religious individuals and 
institutions; they certainly disadvantage religious groups in a 
welfare state where government funding is so common. Under 
this model, the Establishment Clause also imposes serious 
constraints on the government’s ability to express religious 
messages or promote religious ideas. No such constraint applies 
to government support of secular messages or ideas. In this 
complex constitutional regime, restricting government 
interference with religion more aggressively and expansively 
than we restrict government interference with secular beliefs and 
conduct may not be generically unfair -- that is, it should not be 
viewed as unfair when we take into account all of the situations 
in which religion is treated less favorably than secular ideas and 
institutions. 
 Of course, this macro argument will not alleviate fairness 
concerns in every case in which an accommodation is limited to 
religious exercise and does not extend to secular beliefs or belief-
based practices. Still I think there is some value to thinking 
about offsetting benefits and burdens in discussing how the two 
religion clauses fit together. The argument is most useful when 
religion is being discussed as a generic perspective or belief 
system and compared to equally generic secular perspectives and 
beliefs -- which is what Nelson does in the principles section of 
his book.73 
 This quid pro quo analysis is far less precise when we are 
talking about particular faiths. However, I think there is still 
some utility to it. For example, many minority faiths are 
protected by free exercise rights, but are also burdened by 
Establishment Clause constraints on their ability to receive state 
support for religious institutions.74 Orthodox Jews, for example, 
could be (and should have been) protected by a rigorous free 
exercise doctrine that granted them exemptions from Sunday 
closing laws. They would also argue that they are substantially 
burdened by “no aid” doctrine that prohibited government 
support for their Jewish day schools. Similarly, some minority 
faiths would benefit from religious accommodations, but feel 
 
73 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 49.  
74 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (finding that state funding 
religious school teachers’ salaries violates the Establishment Clause). 
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burdened by constitutional constraints on religious displays, 
contending that such restrictions secularize society and 
undermine their religious messages. 
 Indeed, because of the diversity of beliefs in American 
society, many faiths are powerful in some jurisdictions and weak 
in others. If we think about state and local decision-making, the 
Mormons, for example, are limited by the Establishment Clause 
in Utah where they have the political power to be an established 
religion, but they are minorities seeking free exercise protection 
in other jurisdictions, such as California. Even a very large faith 
such as Catholicism -- which can certainly claim to be burdened 
by Establishment Clause constraints on government funding and 
other limitations on the government promotion of religion -- finds 
itself needing free exercise protection when some of its beliefs 
conflict with important secular ideals.75  
 From the perspective of the Limited Liberty Equality 
Model, which serves as the general foundation of Religious 
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, all of this analysis misses the 
mark.  It is grounded in a jurisprudence that has been 
repudiated by the Court and rejected by most church-state 
scholars as well. There is little utility or social coherence for that 
matter in taking Establishment Clause constraints on the 
government’s promotion of religion into account in evaluating the 
fairness of religious accommodations when those constraints no 
longer exist. As I indicated in the beginning of this review, there 
is considerable force to this position. Nonetheless, I believe it is 
important to understand the limits of the competing dominant 
models in contemporary jurisprudence. Focusing on the Rigorous 
Religion Clause model provides what I think is needed 
perspective to understand that the choices we confront today are 
not intrinsic to United States church-state doctrine. 
 Finally, I challenge Nelson’s argument that denying 
religious individuals or institutions exemptions from neutral 
laws of general applicability does not subordinate them, deny 
them equal citizenship, or cause them non-endorsement harms.76 
If the experience of the religious group or individual denied an 
 
75 See, e.g,.  Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 73—
74 (Cal. 2004). See generally Zubic v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) 
76 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 117—119. 
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exemption or accommodation is relevant to the analysis as an 
empirical matter (I think it is, I’m not sure if Nelson does) then I 
think that religious individuals that are denied exemptions often 
feel disrespected and subordinated. Interests that are critically 
important to their identities and core beliefs are ignored and 
treated as if they are valueless and unworthy of recognition.77 
Moreover, I think there is a powerful, socially coherent argument 
that supports the idea of non-endorsement and disrespect in 
these cases.  
 We live in a society where exemptions from laws are 
commonplace. Legislation is often drafted along the contours of 
interest groups that lobby and use their political influence to 
skew the parameters of laws. Often, the interests that influence 
legislative decisions may seem unimportant and undeserving of 
attention to neutral observers. Compromises in legislation are a 
statement about which groups count in our society. Further, if we 
focus on religion, in most cases laws are drafted to avoid the 
burdening of large, politically-powerfuI faiths.78  If the contours 
of the law circumscribe the practices of religious majorities, 
exemptions are unnecessary. With that understanding as a 
foundation for evaluating the message communicated by 
government conduct, denying religious exemptions may certainly 
be characterized as communicating a message of subordination 
and disrespect.79 
IV. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND EXEMPTIONS FROM CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAWS PROHIBITING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
 Nelson’s analysis of freedom of association and its impact 
on laws prohibiting employment discrimination is thoughtful, 
nuanced and complicated. This makes it difficult to summarize 
and discuss his analysis in a relatively brief essay such as this 
one. Accordingly, I am going to focus on a few core ideas. 
 Nelson breaks down private associations into three 
categories: 
 
 
77 See Brownstein, Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue, A Discussion of Justice 
Steven’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, supra note 56, at 631-56..  
78 Id. at 632-33. . 
79 Id. at 631—36. 
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1. Intimate associations. The classic example of an intimate 
association is the family. Indeed, it is not clear to me that 
anything other than familial relationships are included in 
this category in Nelson’s association cosmology. We 
protect these associations because they are basic to 
personhood – to the self-defining identity of a person. 
Constitutional law provides maximum protection to 
intimate associations against anti-discrimination laws.80 
 
2. Close and contained associations. These are defined as 
local organizations that are limited in size. They are 
critically important organizations because of the role they 
play in value formation among their members. These 
associations are incubators of views on fundamental 
questions of personal and public morality. Associations do 
not qualify to be included in this category if they are too 
large or are not tightly knit.81  
3. Values organizations. These associations are regional and 
national in size. They are primarily important because 
they express independent voices in the marketplace of 
ideas.82  
 
 As to all of these associations, Nelson suggests that there is 
generally no socially coherent or persuasive reason to treat 
religious groups differently than secular groups.83 Intimate 
associations, as well as close and contained associations should 
be allowed to choose their members and leaders without the 
constraints of anti-discrimination laws. Values organizations 
should be shielded from anti-discrimination laws in the selection 
of their leaders or speakers but only to the extent that doing so is 
required by their ideological commitments and mission.84 
 The analysis changes to some extent if we shift from an 
association’s decisions regarding membership and leaders to an 
association’s decisions regarding employment. Intimate 
 
80 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 82. 
81 Id. at 83—85. 
82 Id. at 85. 
83 Id. at 88—96.  
84 Id. 
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associations’ constitutional protection does not extend to 
employment, such as the hiring of baby sitters or a clerk at a 
Mom and Pop store, but civil rights laws often exclude small 
business operations from their coverage in any case.85 
 For discrimination in employment purposes, close and 
contained local community associations can hire employees in 
leadership positions free from civil rights laws. As to other 
employees, these associations can discriminate on the basis of 
belief or ideology pretty much across the board, but they cannot 
discriminate in hiring on other grounds.86  
 With regard to values organizations, policy makers and 
communicators can be hired and fired free from the constraints of 
civil rights laws, but only for reasons that are required by their 
mission or ideology. Also, employees whose work is connected to 
the formation or implementation of the group’s mission can be 
subject to belief discrimination and perhaps other kinds of 
discrimination as well.87 
 I think there are problems with the way these categories 
are defined by function. For example, the line between close 
associations that are important because of the role they play in 
value formation and larger values associations that are 
important because they express independent voices in the 
marketplace of ideas seems somewhat arbitrary.  Larger 
organizations may play an important role in value formation as 
well as the dissemination of ideas. It is not uncommon for a 
national religious association, such as a mainline Protestant 
denomination, for example, to decide the values the 
denomination will espouse on controversial issues such as the 
denomination’s position on homosexual relationships and same-
sex marriage through a national discussion among the 
representatives of local congregations. That seems to me to be 
value formation at the national level. Local congregations 
categorized as close associations, on the other hand, frequently 
add their independent voice to the local marketplace of ideas. 
However, it is probably the case that no manageable category 
scheme for associations can avoid some arbitrary line drawing.  
 
85 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 146-47. 
86 Id. at 147—48.  
87 Id. at 148. 
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Some imprecision in defining categories is simply the price of 
working with a limited number of categories. 
 My primary concerns with Nelson’s freedom of association 
analysis go to more fundamental matters. To begin with, I 
believe that there is a powerful and persuasive socially coherent 
argument for treating religious associations and institutions 
differently than their secular counterparts. 
 Looking at the way the law operates, it seems clear to me 
that the distinction between the religious and the secular is 
pervasive in our society and legal system. Specific religious 
accommodations are hardly uncommon and there are numerous 
notable examples of constitutional and statutory law 
distinguishing between religious and secular institutions. The 
ministerial exception applies only to religious congregations.88 
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, but not 
discrimination on the basis of secular belief or identity. Title VII 
only exempts religious organizations from the prohibition against 
religious discrimination.89 RLUIPA only applies to religious land 
uses. Obviously, the beneficiaries of the land use provisions of 
this federal law are religious associations. Federal RFRA and 
numerous state RFRA’s also apply exclusively to religious 
associations and institutions as well as religious individuals. 
Thus, I think some distinction between religious and secular 
associations and institutions is accepted and settled in our legal 
system. 
 I think there are several justifications for this distinction. 
First, there is a sense in which a religious congregation overlaps 
all three of the different associations that Nelson describes. 
Religious congregations connect with family life more than any 
other kind of association in our society. Religion relates to 
marriage, procreation, child rearing, life cycle changes, and the 
death of family members. For devoutly religious people, religion 
is an intrinsic part of their family association. Religious 
congregations are obviously involved in value formation and the 
transmission of values within the religious community. Religious 
associations also have a voice in the market place of ideas. While 
 
88 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 
705—06 (2012). 
89 See generally Spencer v. World Vision, 633 F. 3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011).  
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national or regional religious associations may be speakers and 
idea communicators at the state or national level, religious 
congregations have a voice at the local level. I doubt that any 
secular association can demonstrate the depth and breadth of 
religious associations across these categorical lines. 
 Second, many Americans believe in the concept that 
certain conduct, places, and purposes are holy or sacred. A house 
of worship and related facilities is a sanctuary – a sacred place. 
Funds donated to religious associations are reserved for sacred 
purposes. Even if a church allows a third party to use its multi-
purpose facility for a non-denominational purpose, there is an 
understanding that the use of space must be consistent with the 
sacred nature of the location. Similarly, if a religious 
congregation hires staff using funds that were donated to it for 
denominational purposes, the congregation should be able to 
require that employees hired support it’s beliefs and mission. 
 Third, courts are sensitive and rightly so to legal standards 
that require treating certain religions differently than others. 
The parameters of the close, contained, and tightly knit 
association that Nelson envisions seem indeterminate. If there is 
no special rule for religious congregations, one must assume that 
some congregations are insufficiently close or tightly knit to fall 
within the category. Similarly, some discriminatory decisions by 
religious values organizations may be deemed necessary to the 
organization’s mission while discriminatory decisions by other 
religious organizations may be determined to be inadequately 
connected to the organization’s mission.90 A legal framework that 
results in certain religious associations being permitted to 
discriminate while other, similar, religious organizations are 
denied such exemptions undermines our commitment to religious 
neutrality.  
 Fourth, religious institutions operate under Establishment 
Clause constraints. These institutions may be ineligible for 
 
90 The primary reason Justice Brennan concurred in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987)  to uphold the broad 
exemption from Title VII which permitted religious organizations to discriminate on the 
basis of religion in hiring staff was that he doubted the ability of courts and juries to 
accurately determine what constituted a religious function for minority faiths. Id. at 
2872—73 (Brennan, J., concurring). One might be equally concerned about judicial 
discretion in determining what is required by a religious association’s mission.  
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government aid that their secular counterparts receive. The 
government may provide expressive support for the mission of 
secular associations, but cannot provide similar encouragement 
to religious groups. Given the Establishment Clause limitations 
that religious institutions operate under, one might argue that 
distinctive associational freedom for religious organizations 
works to even the playing field to some extent. 
 I understand that Nelson is unpersuaded by my argument 
that religious organizations are distinctive because their 
autonomy and protection implicates each of the three 
constitutional values that underlie his categorical framework: 
intimate association, value formation, and the dissemination of 
independent voices in the market place of ideas. But I am not 
sure why. I think that a values based analysis of church-state 
issues, which recognizes that multiple values are in play, 
demands that we look to the accumulation of values and interests 
on both sides of conflicts, in order to resolve problems and 
ultimately develop doctrine. If a rule of decision, such as 
protecting the autonomy of religious associations, furthers more 
of the values we consider relevant and important to associational 
freedom, I think that rule is independently and distinctly 
justifiable compared to other rules of decision that further more 
limited values. 
 I also recognize that the forth distinction has limited 
applicability in light of the current Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. This contention is one of the places where I am 
arguing from a Rigorous Religion clause model while Nelson’s 
analysis is grounded, in many ways quite reasonably, in more 
contemporary religion clause jurisprudence.  If we are limited by 
the parameters of current religion clause doctrine to a conflict 
between the One-Sided Neutrality Model and the Limited 
Liberty, Equalitarian Model, there is considerable persuasive 
force to Nelson’s analysis calling for the equalizing of the 
associational freedom of religious and secular associations.  
 My arguments about the distinctive nature of religion and 
the special justifications for protecting religious associational 
autonomy clash with a church-state jurisprudence that insists 
that there is nothing distinctive about religious organizations 
and that, accordingly, religious organizations should receive 
government financial support on the same terms as secular 
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organizations. My arguments clash with the reality that religious 
organizations which claim a special autonomy right to operate 
independently from government will also be receiving substantial 
government funds – funds which are being provided to the 
religious organization to serve the public good as that good is 
determined by the state officials who authorize and review such 
subsidies. My arguments about the special nature and status of 
religious beliefs and identity clash with a jurisprudence that 
permits government to influence individual and collective 
religious beliefs through its power to sponsor and express 
religious displays, sectarian messages, and directed prayers in 
government meetings and activities. 
 Perhaps, most importantly, my arguments must confront 
the reality that autonomy and freedom from state regulatory 
interference in determining an association’s members and hiring 
its staff is empowering. Having distinctive autonomy protection 
provides associations with expressive missions a valuable 
competitive advantage in the market place of ideas. It gives 
religious voices a stronger and less encumbered foundation that 
their secular counterparts.91 Who would doubt that a legal 
framework providing left wing organizations distinctive 
autonomy protection and freedom from regulations unavailable 
to right wing organizations distorted the marketplace of ideas? 
How then, if all else is equal with regard to government support 
and promotion of religious and secular organizations in funding 
and government speech, can we justify providing religious 
associations valuable freedoms that are not available to their 
secular counterparts? 
 Let us put these establishment clause concerns aside, at 
least for the moment. My intuitive discomfort with Nelson’s 
framework for resolving associational freedom issues and 
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws goes beyond my 
contention that the nature of religious associations justifies 
providing them distinctive protection. I also worry that Nelson’s 
approach creates serious risks that an analysis which 
distinguishes between religious and secular associations is more 
 
91 See Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 17, at 271—74; see 
also Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates, supra note 19 
at 1714. 
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likely to avoid. Basically, Nelson urges us to expand the scope of 
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws for secular associations 
– particularly for close associations. Under his thesis, such 
associations can discriminate against anyone in choosing 
members and can discriminate on the basis of religion or secular 
belief in hiring staff. What is critical here is that religious 
congregations receive no special associational protection because 
they are religious. At the local level, they would only receive 
protection against anti-discrimination laws if they qualify as a 
close association.  
 Initially that analysis seemed to me to locate conflicts 
between religious liberty and anti-discrimination laws 
somewhere between the proverbial rock and a hard place.  On the 
one hand, I worried that under Nelson’s analysis we would define 
close associations so narrowly we would end up not protecting a 
lot of religious congregations against anti-discrimination laws. 
On the other hand, I thought if close associations were defined 
more broadly to include all or virtually all religious 
congregations, we would end up protecting a very large number 
of local associations against civil rights laws that prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of religion – and perhaps on the basis 
of other protected identities as well. 
  I recognize that determining the scope of associational 
freedom and the resolution of conflicts between associational 
freedom and anti-discrimination laws is a difficult undertaking. 
And this is particularly so when we are discussing close 
associations. There is a perilous Catch 22 here. These are 
associations that play a critically important role in the formation 
of values in our society. These associations are incubators of the 
society’s and polity’s views on fundamental questions of personal 
and public morality. Thus, there is a powerful case to be made for 
extending substantial protection to these associations against 
government interference with their membership and hiring 
decisions.  If we define freedom of association expansively, 
however, these values will be formed and fundamental questions 
answered in associations where racial minorities and women are 
not members and Jews and Moslems cannot even be hired as 
employees. It is in the nature of rights that they are expensive 
political goods, but this is surely a very high price to pay, both for 
excluded individuals and groups and for society as a whole. 
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 While conceding the difficulty of the project, I remain 
unconvinced that a neutral and generic approach to associational 
freedom is preferable to an analysis that distinguishes between 
religious and secular associations and provides distinctive 
protection for religious institutional autonomy. In e-mail 
correspondence with Nelson after the conference, he made it 
clear that the close association category was intended to include 
all local religious congregations with the possible exception of 
mega-churches. That clarification alleviates my concern about 
the rock – about religious congregations falling outside the 
category and receiving inadequate protection. However, it does 
not reduce my misgivings about the hard place – the risk that 
this analysis substantially expands the scope of exemptions from 
anti-discrimination laws. 
 The picture presented by this approach in small town 
America may be particularly bleak. Here, there may be an 
insufficient number of minority group residents to organize many 
associations of their own. Minorities may be systematically shut 
out of the public life of the community by being denied 
membership in all of the private associations in which social, 
political, and economic bonds are developed. Size is relative. A 
club with 50 members may monopolize life in a small town while 
a club with 350 members may be a drop in the bucket of 
associational choices in New York City. 
 Nelson does not believe his framework risks this result. He 
certainly does not intend for it to require these consequences. 
The definition of close associations, however, is sufficiently 
indeterminate that it is difficult to know exactly how these 
exemptions from civil rights laws would apply. Nelson relies on 
case law defining a bona fide private club to provide working 
guidelines for defining a close association.92 I confess that I have 
not studied this line of authority closely. I’m not sure whether it 
focuses on value formation which is the defining characteristic of 
close associations under Nelson’s framework.  
 More importantly, I don’t think the courts developing and 
applying these criteria to private clubs thought that they were 
also developing doctrine which would determine whether a 
religious congregation would be exempt from anti-discrimination 
 
92 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 90—91.  
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laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion. The 
criteria for identifying a protected association might have been 
broadened considerably, if courts recognized that this would be 
the only basis for protecting the associational autonomy of 
religious congregations and organizations. 
 Let’s consider the synagogue I attend as an example to 
illustrate the problem. I live in Davis, California. It is a college 
town of about 30,000 students and 30,000 non-student residents. 
The membership of my synagogue, Congregation Bet Haverim, is 
about 275 families. That’s fairly large for a small town, but other 
religious congregations in Davis are even larger. We are very 
non-selective in accepting members. You have to be Jewish, but 
that’s about it and we don’t inquire very much about why you 
think you are Jewish. A lot of houses of worship in Davis are like 
that. If a person asserts that he or she accepts the doctrines of 
the faith, they are accepted as a member. No other qualifications 
for membership are required. 
 If religious congregations such as Bet Haverim will be 
recognized as a close association, not because it is a religious 
association, but because of its generic characteristics, then I 
assume that other associations of similar size, and a similar level 
of selectivity, would also, necessarily, have a strong case that 
they qualify as a close association. We would also take into 
account the key purpose for protecting close associations – 
independent value formation.93 That is certainly true for a 
synagogue or other house of worship. Presumably, other 
associations that satisfy the size and selectivity criteria and also 
are involved in value formation would be very strong candidates 
for inclusion in the close association category. 
 If my synagogue satisfies the criteria for identifying a close 
association, arguably a great many other local associations fit 
these criteria as well. Consider local youth programs such as the 
Little League or AYSO (soccer league). I think the Little League 
is far more selective than my synagogue. It discriminates on the 
basis of age, geography, and gender.94 It also claims to be focused 
 
93 Id. at 84 (“[I]dentifying groups that qualify for this sort of First Amendment 
protection ought not to be a formalistic exercise; rather, it should always relate back to 
the purposes for protecting community groups in a democratic society.”). 
94 See David Fintz, The Women’s Right To Participate In The Game Of Baseball,15 
CARDOZO J.L & GENDER 641, 652 (2009). 
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on value formation: the values of perseverance, teamwork, 
sportsmanship etc. Suppose in a particular town, the local Little 
League decided to exclude Muslims because it argued that Islam 
was inconsistent with the association’s ideals about 
sportsmanship and teamwork.  Then it would even be more 
selective. If a religious congregation is a close association, all 
youth programs similar to the Little League are as well and 
exemptions for these organizations from anti-discrimination laws 
would be required. Nelson tentatively agrees that under his 
analysis these youth organizations are close associations.  
 By analogy, I thought that small county bar associations 
would also be close associations.  They do not have official 
responsibilities or authority like the State Bar in California. 
They are completely voluntary. They are limited by profession 
and geography. They are very involved with legal ethics and 
value formation. Moreover, there are numerous other “bar 
associations” that identify with particular groups of lawyers: the 
Hispanic bar association, the Asian Pacific bar association, a 
Jewish bar association. There are other legal associations that do 
not call themselves bar associations: the Women’s Lawyers 
Association or the Christian Legal Society. And then there is the 
Inn of Court which is very selective of individual members.  
 All of these groups are involved with value formation to 
some degree (some more than others). Are these close 
associations? If they limited their membership or leadership 
positions to Hispanics, women, Christians etc., they would be as 
or more selective than my synagogue. Would they be protected 
against some anti-discrimination laws? The membership of all of 
these associations practice a particular profession and to that 
extent there is an economic dimension to their identity. Nelson 
argues that this would preclude them from being recognized as a 
close association. I am not sure why this should be the case. No 
one would mistake the Christian Legal Society or an Inn of Court 
Chapter for a trade association. Further, very selective private 
clubs may limit their membership to professionals, e.g., doctors, 
lawyers, and successful businessmen and women etc. Local 
plumbers or high school teachers need not apply. If these clubs 
are close associations even though they limit their membership to 
a range of professionals, it is not clear to me why an association 
comprised of members of a particular profession is not a close 
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association as well. Certainly, I would think far more value 
formation activities occur at an Inn of Court or Christian Legal 
Society meeting than at a restricted athletic club. 
 I also thought that parent organizations such as the PTA 
might be a close association. In Davis, they are divided by school, 
and the elementary schools are not that large. I do not know 
whether they are formally limited to the parents of children 
attending a particular school or if that is just the general custom, 
but suppose membership in each chapter is limited to the parents 
of children attending a particular school. A school PTA in Davis 
is usually much smaller than my congregation. Would that make 
it a close association compared to a religious congregation? PTA’s 
are very involved in value formation. Leaving aside the question 
of whether discriminatory policies would be acceptable to the 
national parent organization, if a group organized and identified 
itself as the Women’s PTA for X school on the theory that raising 
kids is a woman’s job, would it be permitted to exclude male 
parents? Would a Christian PTA chapter be a close association 
permitted to exclude Jewish and Muslim parents?  
 Nelson suggests that a PTA chapter would not be a close 
association, but again I am not sure why this must be so. Surely 
parents of a particular faith whose children attend the same 
public school could create a private association to address school 
concerns from the perspective of their faith. If they discovered 
that this group included many of the members of the school’s 
PTA, why would they not be permitted to reconstitute themselves 
as the Protestant PTA of X school? 
 I thought neighborhood associations might also be 
sufficiently small and selective to constitute a close association. 
Neighborhood definitions and boundaries are arbitrary. A group 
may define the “neighborhood” in ways that include residents of 
certain races and economic classes and exclude residents who live 
a couple of blocks away because they are poorer or ethnically 
different. There is no rule defining the boundaries of 
neighborhood associations. The boundaries are defined by the 
members who start the association. Or think of an ethnic 
neighborhood association such as a “Chinatown” neighborhood 
association. There are no fixed limits to what constitutes 
“Chinatown” in a city. Such an association may draw boundary 
lines based on the ethnicity of residents. These neighborhood 
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associations may be larger or smaller than my synagogue. To the 
extent that they promote the cultural values of a particular 
ethnic community, they would seem to be involved in value 
formation. 
 From my various post conference discussions with Nelson, 
I think he envisions the operation of his generic associational 
freedom framework to protect virtually all religious 
congregations and houses of worship as close associations. But it 
would not protect discriminatory decisions by so many other 
associations that religious minorities, and in some circumstances 
other minorities as well, could be effectively excluded from much 
of the public life of a community. I need to have a better 
understanding of how the framework he endorses can accomplish 
this goal. 
  American society intuitively recognizes that religious 
groups, notwithstanding all of the good that they do for their own 
members and the community at large, are intrinsically 
exclusionary. That intuition, I suggest, is not so commonly 
accepted for other kinds of associations in our society. The fact 
that the exclusionary nature of religious associations is 
recognized to be distinctive and deserving of greater protection 
from the mandates of civil rights laws than secular associations 
may be a valuable working arrangement that maximizes both 
religious liberty and anti-discrimination principles. While our 
communities wrestle with the extent to which we should 
accommodate religious exemptions from civil rights 
requirements, we need to keep our eye on our ultimate goals. A 
legal regime which provides less distinctive protection to 
religious liberty while allowing more discrimination against 
minorities by secular organizations may not be the best solution 
to the admittedly difficult conflict between liberty and equality 
interests that we are confronting today. 
V. THE SOCIALLY COHERENT ANALOGY TO IDENTITY 
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
 One final issue regarding employment discrimination is 
very difficult to resolve, but I think it needs to be addressed. 
Nelson argues with considerable persuasive force that 
exemptions from civil rights laws for religious organizations, like 
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the exemption in Title VII from the prohibition against religious 
discrimination in hiring, are limited to belief or ideological 
discrimination. Religious organizations cannot discriminate 
against any of the groups recognized in Title VII and protected as 
to their identity, such as racial minorities or women.95 In this 
sense, Nelson suggests that religious organizations are being 
treated just like secular organizations. An environmental 
organization, for example, is permitted to discriminate against 
non-environmentalists in hiring staff. Similarly, religious 
organizations can discriminate in hiring in favor of members of 
their own faith. Thus, both religious and secular organizations 
can discriminate on the basis of a job applicant’s beliefs, but not 
other prohibited grounds, without violating civil rights laws.96 
 I think this analysis is too summary in its characterization 
of the operation of civil rights laws and the exemption provided 
for religious organizations. We do not protect religious 
individuals against discrimination on the basis of religion in civil 
rights statutes because we are trying to protect the liberty right 
to hold religious beliefs or limit employers from engaging in belief 
(or ideological) discrimination. We include religion as a protected 
class in civil rights statutes like Title VII because we believe 
religion is an identity, just like race and sex describe a person’s 
identity.97 We prohibit discrimination in hiring on the basis of 
religion because religion describes who a person is, not what they 
do or say or believe.98 
 Accordingly, when we allow religious organizations to 
discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring, we are permitting 
those organizations to discriminate against the members of a 
protected class defined by its members’ identity. Secular 
organizations receive no similar exemption. They are not 
permitted to discriminate against job applicants based on the 
person’s identity if that identity is recognized as defining a 
protected class. Non-environmentalists are not recognized as 
having a distinctive identity nor are they members of a protected 
 
95 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 89, 91—92. 
96 Id. at 95—96.  
97 See William P. Marshall, Smith, Christian Legal Society and Speech-Based Claims 
for Religious Exemptions from Neutral laws of General Applicability, 32 CARDOZO L REV. 
1937, 1939—42 (2011). 
98 Id.  
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class. The law treats such individuals as people who hold 
particular beliefs, not as people who have a distinct identity.99 
Further, the law does not recognize the need to protect people 
who hold such beliefs from discrimination in hiring. The 
foundation of class prejudice and discrimination which civil 
rights laws are designed to challenge simply does not apply to 
people whose beliefs are in some way insufficiently pro-
environment. 
 Conceptualized in this way, we confront a more difficult 
question when we try to explain why a religious organization, say 
a Protestant denomination, can discriminate against Muslims or 
Jews, but not women or African-Americans. In both 
circumstances, the religious organization may claim that 
discrimination is required by the tenets of its faith and in both 
cases it is discriminating against the members of a protected 
class based on their religious, racial, or sexual identity. 
 The answer to that question, whatever it is, will be 
relevant to any discussion of exemptions for religious 
organizations from civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. We will have to decide whether 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is more like 
discrimination on the basis of religion – for which an exemption 
is granted to religious organizations – or whether it is more like 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender or national ancestry 
where exemptions from employment discrimination laws are 
generally denied. 
 A social coherence analysis is based in considerable part on 
reasoning by analogy. The question we need to answer here 
requires us to determine what would be the most persuasive 
analogy for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. I 
have spent some time trying to think through the answer to this 
question,100 and I suggest it is not susceptible to an easy and 
obvious answer.  
 
 
99 Id. at 1941.  
100 Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case 
for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to 
Marry, 45 U.S.F.L REV. 389 (2010). 
